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Elite Power Games and Democratic Consolidation in 
Central and Eastern Europe [1999] 
John Higley & Jan Pakulski  
Abstract: »Machtspiele von Eliten und demokratische Konsolidierung in Mit-
tel- und Osteuropa«. Postcommunist elites play rational power games through-
out East Central and Eastern Europe today. But their games differ according to 
the structure, behavioral codes, and informal orientations associated with the 
paths of elite change. Although democratic institutions and procedures are in 
place just about everywhere, the differing elite power games account for major 
differences in extra-electoral politics and, thus, for wide variations in the quali-
ty of postcommunist democracies. The extent of the particularisms – clientel-
ism and patronage, blurred functional autonomies and boundaries, violations of 
horizontal accountabilities, manipulations of the media and judiciary, harass-
ment of opposition elites, personal vendettas, persecutions of minorities – de-
fine these power games, and they can be linked systematically to the patterns 
of elite unity, differentiation, and circulation. We view combinations of these 
patterns as constituting the critical elite conditions for different types of politi-
cal regimes, including consolidated democracies. 
Keywords: elite, elite change, postcommunist democracies. 
 
Except in conflict-ridden Bosnia and the heavy-handed regimes of Albania, 
Belarus, Croatia, and the current Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), democratic 
elections involving reasonably fair and free contests between parties and rela-
tively unhindered voting by citizens are being institutionalized in postcommu-
nist Central and Eastern Europe. Elites and mass publics increasingly take for 
granted the continuance of democratic elections and their role in determining 
who will hold government office. Electoral competitions have produced one or 
more peaceful alternations of governing parties or coalitions in Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Baltics; elsewhere, elec-
tions have reshuffled parliamentary constellations in ways that have checked 
the actions of governments. In these respects, democratic politics are or are 
becoming “the only game in town,” and at least a handful of the postcommunist 
democracies are on the road to consolidation.  
As Guillermo O’Donnell (1996) has argued, however, the process of democ-
ratic consolidation belies large differences in how politics are actually played, 
or, as Linz and Stepan (1996) put it, consolidated democracies differ impor-
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tantly in their quality. This view is shared by demo-elite theorists and more 
institutional- and mass-oriented “consolidologists.” Emphasizing the elite craft-
ing of democracies, the former worry about power centralizations that reduce 
elites’ accountability, but they also worry about power fragmentations that 
impede elite effectiveness. Consolidologists worry, inter alia, about plebisci-
tarian presidents, authoritarian enclaves, and weak civil societies that make for 
delegative or facade democracies (Schedler, 1998). Both groups of scholars 
agree that, especially in newly-formed democratic regimes, actual political 
practices often undercut democratic processes. 
Gaps of varying sizes between formal electoral competitions and informal 
political practices clearly exist in the postcommunist democracies of Central 
and Eastern Europe. Our aim is to identify these gaps and assess their conse-
quences for democratic consolidation. We believe that the key variable in com-
paring postcommunist democracies is not the institutionalization of freely 
contested and participatory elections; it is, rather, the informal rules and orien-
tations that generate and govern elite power games.  
Students of democratic consolidation too often underplay the role of elites in 
ensuring that democratic politics are continuous, effective, and of high quality. 
They concentrate on constitutions and electoral rules, and on civil society, 
economic markets, and state administrative arenas at the expense of studying 
informal elite relations and the tacit codes of conduct they involve. In previous 
work (Higley and Pakulski, 1995; Higley, Pakulski, and Wesolowski, 1998), 
we have highlighted two dimensions of change in elite relations: the extent of 
elite unity and differentiation. In this paper, we add a third dimension, which is 
the extent and form of elite circulation. Our hope is that by interrelating pat-
terns of elite unity, differentiation, and circulation, we can shed light on the 
elite power games and particularistic practices that characterize politics in the 
postcommunist countries. 
It is important to say immediately that we view elite “unity in diversity” as 
the crucial condition for effective and meaningful democratic politics. This 
involves not only a common elite commitment to democratic procedures, but 
also restrained partisanship and elite legitimation in the sense of a reciprocal 
recognition by elites that they are together legitimate power-wielders. Re-
strained partisanship and elite legitimation lie beyond the formal institutional-
procedural aspects of democracy. They constitute an informal and prior set of 
conduct-guiding orientations amounting to an elite ethos. We hypothesize that 
the extent to which elites develop and adhere to this ethos, as well as the extent 
to which aspiring elites are socialized into it, are affected by patterns of elite 
circulation. Orientations and behaviors that are accepting of both elite inclu-
siveness and relative autonomy, which we and other scholars (e.g., Keller, 
1963; Etzioni-Halevy, 1993) have identified as key aspects of elite differentia-
tion, are also affected by patterns of elite circulation. By combining the dimen-
sions of unity and differentiation and linking them to circulation patterns, we 
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distinguish three main configurations in the postcommunist countries today: 
consensual elites, dominated by professional politicians and technocrats; frag-
mented elites, dominated by former apparatchiks and technocrats; divided 
elites, dominated by former apparatchiks and populists.  
Path-dependency theorists point to the cumulative legacies that shape politi-
cal regimes. We argue that these legacies are important in accounting for varia-
tions in the politics of the postcommunist countries, especially the consensual, 
fragmented, and divided elite configurations that undergird the several types of 
regimes found among the countries today. A “classic circulation” path was 
taken by elites in countries where the communist party-state was always quite 
incomplete (Poland) or where it was gradually eroded (Hungary, Slovenia, and, 
with qualifications, Czechoslovakia). This facilitated elite roundtable negotia-
tions to effect democratic transitions, and it eased the post-transition recon-
struction of regimes. By contrast, a “reproduction circulation” path was taken 
by elites in countries where the communist party-state was more firmly en-
trenched (Bulgaria, Slovakia, Russia, and Ukraine). This has led to fragmented 
elites in which former apparatchiks and technocrats have constituted, at least 
until very recently, “parties of power.” A path of “quasi-replacement circula-
tion,” in which one clique in the old communist party displaced the ascendant 
clique and thereby greatly truncated the democratic transition (Romania, Ser-
bia-Montenegro, and, with qualifications, Belarus and Croatia), led to power 
games of a perilously zero-sum character. 
We argue, in short, that elites play rational power games throughout East 
Central and Eastern Europe today. But their games differ according to the 
behavioral codes and informal orientations associated with the paths of elite 
change. Although democratic institutions and procedures are in place just about 
everywhere, the differing elite power games account for major differences in 
extra-electoral politics and, thus, for wide variations in the quality of postcom-
munist democracies. The extent of the particularisms that O’Donnell (1996) 
has highlighted – clientelism and patronage, blurred functional autonomies and 
boundaries, violations of horizontal accountabilities, manipulations of the me-
dia and judiciary, harassments of opposition elites, personal vendettas, persecu-
tions of minorities – define these power games, and they can be linked system-
atically to the paths that elite change followed.  
Elite Unity, Differentiation, and Circulation 
Let us begin with a model that interrelates patterns of elite unity, differentia-
tion, and circulation. We view combinations of these patterns as constituting 
the critical elite conditions for different types of political regimes, including 
consolidated democracies. One component of the model is the typology of 
national elite unity and differentiation that we have offered previously (Higley 
and Pakulski, 1995; Higley, Pakulski, and Wesolowski, 1998). In a nutshell, 
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elite unity has two dimensions: normative and interactive. The normative di-
mension involves the extent of shared beliefs and values, as well as more spe-
cific shared norms, most of them informal and uncodified, about political 
access, competition, and restrained partisanship. The interactive dimension 
involves the extent of inclusionary channels, mechanisms, and networks 
through which elite persons and groups obtain relatively assured access to 
decisionmaking centers. Elite differentiation is the extent to which elites are 
sectorally and organizationally diverse, and partly autonomous. The most im-
portant for us is horizontal (functional) aspect of differentiation: the relative 
autonomy cum insulation of institutional power spheres from each other in the 
sense of power resource convertibility. As the students of communist regimes 
stress, it has been systematically eroded and obstracted by the overarching 
nature of “party leading role” resulting in “politicization” of all the areas of 
rule and the “unitary” image the elites (eg. Elster et al. 1998). Whereas the 
unity or disunity of elites originates in watershed political events, such as na-
tional state formation, revolutions, or major political crises, the differentiation 
of elites occurs more gradually in step with processes of industrialization and 
social modernization – though differentiation may be slowed, as it was during 
the 1960’s-80’s in the Soviet Union (Hough, 1997), where a dominant elite 
group forces all others to adhere to its distinctive orientation, ideology, reli-
gious dogma, or ethnonationalist creed. 
Differences in the extent of unity and differentiation define the main con-
figurations of national elites: strong or weak unity, accompanied by wide or 
narrow differentiation. These configurations are, in turn, principal determinants 
of regime types: consolidated democracies, or perhaps a Rechtsstaat, where 
there is both strong unity and wide differentiation; authoritarian or sultanistic 
regimes where there is neither; totalitarian or post-totalitarian regimes where 
there is strong unity but narrow differentiation; and unconsolidated democra-
cies, possibly oscillating with short-lived authoritarian regimes, where there is 
wide differentiation but weak unity (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Configurations of National Elites (and Associated Regime Types) 
  Elite Unity 
  Strong Weak 
 
Wide 
Consensual elite 
(consolidated democ.) 
(possibly a Rechtsstaat) 
Fragmented elite 
(unconsolidated democ.) 
(possibly a short-lived 
authoritarian regime) 
Elite 
Differentiation 
   
 
Narrow 
Ideocratic elite 
(totalitarian or post-
totalitarian regime) 
Divided elite 
(authoritarian or  
sultanistic regime) 
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These four configurations generate distinct types of power games, that is, the 
strategies and tactics that elite players adopt. Power games in a consensual elite 
are unconstrained by some ideocratic blueprint or telos of change, and they 
involve competitions and rivalries with stable rules. There is high certainty 
about rules and procedures, but low certainty about political outcomes, with 
today’s winners likely to become tomorrow’s losers, though no one suffers 
mortal costs for losing. Power games in a divided elite, by sharp contrast, ap-
proximate continual warfare, the stakes in which are not just government 
power, but also political freedom and, perhaps, life itself. They are played amid 
deep ideocratic hostilities, the absence of much communication between elite 
camps, and the expectation or occurrence of power usurpations. The games 
approximate free-for-all struggles and have an erratic, oppressive character, 
with whatever low certainties there are depending upon effective domination 
and exclusion. Because of the distrust and hatred that pervade these games, 
breaking out of them is extremely difficult, probably requiring a sudden, delib-
erate, and fundamental elite settlement that can only occur amid some profound 
crisis (Higley and Burton, 1998; Burton and Higley, 1998). 
Power games in a fragmented elite arise from the rapid proliferation of di-
verse political actors and the splintering of protest movements that accompany 
or soon follow many democratic transitions, especially transitions that involve 
regime collapses or implosions (e.g., Czechoslovakia in 1989-90, the Soviet 
Union in 1990-91). They may involve tentative and partial elite pacts and armi-
stices that stave off open political warfare, but that fail to develop an elite ethos 
of unity in diversity. Conflicts are heated, and monopolistic “parties of power,” 
attached to the state, are likely to form. But whereas the power games played in 
a divided elite involve sharp polarization and exclusion, in which opponents 
typically view each other as enemies in unchecked struggles, the games in a 
fragmented elite are played across multiple and conflicting cleavage lines that 
skew the outcomes of, but do not eliminate, democratic competition. Finally, 
the power games in an ideocratic elite resemble a value-oriented quest involv-
ing the kinds of calculations that Weber termed “substantive.” Even where (as 
in a post-totalitarian regime) a single doctrine has ceased to guide elite actions, 
it continues to provide power games with an idiom for elite self-legitimation 
and a formula for governing. Despite this veneer, however, the games consist 
of much jockeying for position in highly centralized and personalized patron-
age networks. 
The four elite configurations in Figure 1 spawn modal varieties of political 
elites that help to define and shape the power games that are played in each 
configuration. If we reverse our order of description and start with the 
ideocratic configuration, its modal political elite consists of apparatchiks, re-
formers, and dissidents. The appratchiki are the product of the ruling party-
state apparata, and they are characteristically oriented strongly toward the top 
echelons and the current party line (partiinost). This extreme form of other-
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directedness involves a mixture of conformity and authoritarianism that has 
been exhaustively analyzed by students of the communist nomenklatura. Simi-
lar to the apparatchiki, the reformers in an ideocratic political elite view politics 
as an authoritarian “game at the top,” though they support a “new line” and the 
party faction representing it. The dissidents in such an elite also see politics as 
a highly personalized game at the top, but they attach a strong moral value to 
political linkages and loyalties thus giving it a strong “anti-political” coloring. 
The size of the dissident category varied greatly among the old communist 
regimes, though some argue that they formed a sizable group only in Poland 
and, perhaps, Hungary. However that may be, the communist party-states’ 
demise left behind legions of apparatchiks and reformers who were highly 
skilled in authoritarian and patronage politics and quite unskilled in democratic 
games of electoral competition and mobilization requiring diffuse appeals for 
support and the formation of coalitions for electoral, governing, and opposition 
purposes. 
The divided configuration spawns a political elite in which committed parti-
sans and mass mobilizers, especially of the populist-charismatic kind, are the 
principal actors. Popular tribunes, populist manipulators, seducers of crowds, 
and other demagogues emerge in, profit from, and fuel the bitter conflicts and 
battle lines that define the divided configuration. Adept in sudden mass mobili-
zations, they thrive on crises and find it hard to operate within institutionalized 
frameworks of norms and rules. The fragmented configuration, on the other 
hand, encourages the ascendancy of technocrats who tend to avoid partisan 
alignments and promise neutral and efficient government. In Central and East-
ern Europe, technocrats first entered communist elites at the time of pre-
transition reforms, and they became prominent actors in the gradually differen-
tiating elite structures and societal sectors that followed democratic transitions. 
Unlike the communist party reformers they accompanied to power, the techno-
crats are oriented toward more universalistic sets of rules and criteria of exper-
tise in economic, legal, managerial, and technical-scientific domains. Finally, 
the restrained, regularized, and only modestly rewarded political competitions 
that are characteristic of the consensual configuration make politics into a 
vocation and give rise to professional politicians. Their recruitment is elon-
gated and institutionalized in hierarchical bodies (parliaments, councils, parties, 
trade unions, business associations, religious, educational and other cultural 
organizations) at local, regional, and national levels. In the course of this re-
cruitment, they imbibe political norms and rules that constitute the ethos of 
unity in diversity.  
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Patterns of Elite Circulation 
We next link the origin and persistence of the four basic elite configurations 
and associated regime types to patterns of elite circulation. As treated by Mo-
sca and Pareto, elite circulation takes many forms, the two extreme forms be-
ing, on the one end, elite entrenchment and, thus, circulation mainly by inheri-
tance, and, on the other end, sudden and sweeping revolutionary circulations. 
The two most important aspects of elite circulations are their scope – the hori-
zontal range of the positions affected and the vertical depth from which the 
personnel entering elite positions come – and their mode, that is, the way in 
which elite succession occurs. With respect to scope, one must ask if the range 
of a circulation is narrow or wide – if only the most prominent and politically 
exposed position-holders are replaced, or if incumbents of elite positions are 
changed across the board. One must also ask if a circulation is shallow or deep 
– if elites are drawn from second-echelon (“deputy”) positions within existing 
political and social hierarchies and, thus, represent the established elite political 
and social type, or if many come from far down political and social hierarchies 
or even outside them (i.e., from exile, prison, or an underground movement). 
The range and depth of circulations tend to co-vary: wide circulations typically 
bring many persons to power and influence who were previously distant from 
elite positions. The other key question is the mode of an elite circulation – the 
speed and manner of its occurrence. Circulations may be sudden and coerced, 
as in violent revolutionary overthrows, or gradual and peaceful, with elites 
being replaced incrementally through voluntary resignations, retirements, and 
transfers.  
By dichotomizing the scope and mode of elite circulation, four patterns may 
be distinguished:  
Figure 2: Patterns of Elite Circulation 
  Scope 
  Wide & Deep Narrow & Shallow 
 Gradual & Peaceful Classic Reproduction 
Mode 
 
  
 Sudden & Coerced Replacement Quasi-replacement 
The classic pattern is roughly what Mosca and Pareto regarded as essential for 
elite renewal and, thus, for stable and effective rule. We conceive it as posi-
tionally wide and socially deep in scope, but gradual and peaceful in mode. 
Classic circulation is associated with consensual elites whose ethos of unity in 
diversity allows a relatively smooth turnover of elites across many sectors, at 
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the same time avoiding social closure by keeping elite positions open to per-
sons from different rungs on social and political ladders. The replacement 
pattern is also positionally wide and socially deep in scope, but its mode is 
sudden and coerced, typically involving a revolutionary overthrow. Replace-
ment occurs mainly where elites have been deeply divided and where their 
mutually destructive struggles have opened the door to a seizure of power by a 
small, doctrinaire, but previously quite peripheral counterelite. The countere-
lite’s political triumph is accompanied by sweeping elite replacement and the 
construction of an ideocratic elite.  
By contrast, one may speak of reproduction where circulation is positionally 
narrow and socially shallow, and its mode is gradual and peaceful – where 
existing elites change their ideocratic colors and positional locations in order to 
survive, or where there is a “revolution of the deputies,” in which second-
echelon persons ascend to the top positions. There is no large change in the 
social profiles of elite position-holders so that, despite personnel and positional 
reshuffles, the elite as a whole continues to consist of the same, or very similar, 
social type. On the evidence of circulations that have occurred during the 
1990’s in countries that made up the former Soviet Union, reproduction seems 
most likely to occur where ideocratic elites have collapsed or imploded. Fi-
nally, the quasi-replacement pattern is also narrow and shallow in scope, but its 
mode is sudden and coerced, usually involving a palace coup in which a ruling 
clique is replaced by another clique that displays a different leadership style but 
effects no large change in the character of politics. Quasi-replacements are 
often responses to crises, engineered from within the ascendant camp in a di-
vided elite. They typically involve replacements of the most politically exposed 
power holders in order to stave off or defuse challenges. Quasi-replacements 
may also occur in fragmented elites, though weak elite unity makes it difficult 
to engineer a change of top position holders without descending into the more 
or less open warfare that would indicate a shift to the divided configuration.  
To repeat our thesis, it is that the power games played by elites in the post-
communist democracies of Central and Eastern Europe today, and the ways in 
which aspiring elites are being socialized, vary according to the extent of elite 
unity, differentiation, and circulation. A model relating all three aspects of 
elites to basic types of political regimes is presented in Figure 3. In the remain-
der of this paper, we assess the fit between this model and elite power games, 
first in the years surrounding the 1989-1991 transitions, and then in the most 
recent period.  
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Figure 3: Elite Unity, Differentiation, and Circulation in the  
Production of Regimes 
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were conducive to the emergence of consensual elites, and we have argued that 
this was the main political outcome of the transitions in all three countries. A 
key reason was the way in which elite circulation in the three countries ap-
proximated the classic pattern, i.e., relatively wide and deep in scope, and 
relatively gradual and peaceful (“velvet”) in mode. The 1989 roundtables in 
Warsaw, Budapest, and Prague were preceded by the political articulation of 
opposition elites: most dramatically in Poland with the emergence of Solidarity 
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nine years earlier; most gradually with the steady articulation of reformist and 
technocratic factions in Hungary under the Kadar regime during the 1970’s and 
1980’s; and most unevenly in Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring in 
1968, its harsh repression, and the small but symbolically important Charter 77 
dissidents during the 1980’s. Especially in Poland and Hungary, these events 
gradually altered the composition of elites (Hanley, Yershova, and Anderson, 
1995; Wasilewski and Wnuk-Lipinski, 1995; Szelenyi, Szelenyi, and Kovach, 
1995).  
The roundtables in Warsaw, Budapest, and Prague during 1989 confirmed, 
rather than created, a broad elite consensus about the desirability – or, at least, 
the inevitability – of democratic reforms. Opposition elites were accommo-
dated in the politically inclusive roundtables, but during the year or two follow-
ing them, many of the less experienced and more idealistic opposition leaders, 
together with the communist leaders who had been most directly in charge of 
the old regimes, were eased out through democratic elections, the demobiliza-
tion and splintering of reform movements, and the formation of political parties 
to contest elections. In Czechoslovakia, a power bid by the holdover Slovak 
section of the communist elite resulted in the 1992 velvet divorce, which 
boosted the unity of reformist Czech elites by removing the divisive Czech-
Slovak ethnic rivalry and policy clashes arising from unequal Czech and Slo-
vak economic development. The Slovak elite, by contrast, emerged from the 
divorce fragmented along political, ideological, and ethnic lines, with ex-
communist nationalists, led by Vladimir Meciar and his Movement for a De-
mocratic Slovakia (HZDS), entrenched and locked in a bitter fight with politi-
cal opponents pushing for democratic reforms and minority rights.  
Research on the extent of elite circulation supports this depiction of elite 
change during the transition years in Poland, Hungary, and the two parts of 
Czechoslovakia. Studying what happened to the communist nomenklatura 
elites of Poland and Hungary between 1988 and 1993, Jacek Wasilewski 
(1998) analyzes large samples of those elites to reach the following conclu-
sions: (1) persons in all nomenklatura elite sectors had by 1993 moved in more 
or less equal proportions to command positions in private business; (2) three 
nomenklatura elite groups – persons in the Communist Party apparatus and 
those in the economic and cultural nomenklaturas – had been virtually elimi-
nated from top political positions by 1993; (3) roughly a quarter of communist 
governmental bureaucrats retained their governmental posts in the postcommu-
nist regimes in 1993; (4) overall, just on half of the 1988 nomenklatura elites of 
Hungary and Poland continued to hold elite positions in 1993, albeit usually 
not the same positions; (5) if elderly nomenklatura elites who retired between 
1988 and 1993 are excluded, the ratio of 1988 communist elites who still held 
some postcommunist elite position in 1993 to those who lost elite status during 
those years was 21:10 in Hungary, and 19:10 in Poland. Clearly, the scope of 
elite circulation was quite wide in both countries. Although we know less about 
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its depth – about the extent to which new elites came from far down social and 
political hierarchies – it is a plausible surmise that the opening up of roughly 
half of all elite positions between 1988 and 1993 enabled more than a few such 
persons to gain elite status.  
Patterns of circulation in Czechoslovakia and then in the separate Czech and 
Slovak republics during those years also appear to accord with our model.  
A wide and rapid circulation of elites, especially the political elite, occurred 
in the velvet revolution of November and December 1989 and the subsequent 
June 1990 parliamentary election. However, this circulation was not as much a 
break with all that had gone before as it first seemed because it involved the 
return to power of a number of 1968 reformers, accompanied by dissidents, 
such as Vaclav Havel (Machonin and Tucek, 1997). In the next parliamentary 
election, in June 1992, liberal right-of-center elite groups in the Czech territo-
ries, and nationalist and former communist elites in Slovakia displaced the 
1968 reformers and 1980’s dissidents, with the latter forming the political 
opposition after that election. Studying these changes, Brokl and Mansfeldova 
(1998) conclude that the “grey zone” of middle-level communist technocrats 
and managers rose to front-rank elite positions in Slovakia, whereas circulation 
in the Czech territories was wider in range and depth, although there, too, per-
sons who had been middle-level technocrats and managers in the old commu-
nist regime rose in conspicuous numbers to elite positions in the Czech Repub-
lic after 1992. Comparing the overall circulations of Czech and Slovak elites 
during the transition years, the Czech pattern was more nearly of the classic 
kind, while the Slovak pattern approximated reproduction. 
In our model, the reproduction pattern is associated with fragmented elites, 
in which, though there is adherence to democratic elections, there is at most a 
limited elite accommodation that stops well short of a unity-in-diversity ethos. 
We will say more below about the fragmentation of Slovak elites since inde-
pendence at the end of 1992. Here we want to note that the scope of elite circu-
lation in Bulgaria was also narrow and shallow, though its mode was gradual 
and peaceful via haphazard, frequently deadlocked, and quite inconclusive 
roundtable negotiations during the first five months of 1990. After ousting 
Communist Party Secretary Todor Zhivkov in early November 1989, large 
parts of the communist establishment, including reformers, nationalists, and 
political opportunists, formed an ideologically loose coalition of convenience, 
centered in the ex-communist Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). These persons 
continued to dominate, but not monopolize, elite positions in the postcommu-
nist regime. Like Meciar’s HZDS in Slovakia, the BSP elites constituted a 
“party of power” anchored in governmental bodies and government-controlled 
industrial conglomerates (Kostova, 1994). Political opposition was marginal-
ized and harassed, though it was not suppressed (Nikolov, 1998). A brief and 
ineffective opposition coalition government during 1991-92 gave way to a 
caretaker government of technocrats that was supported by, and was favorable 
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to, the BSP establishment until the BSP recaptured government power in the 
December 1994 elections. During the transition years, in short, there was nei-
ther a fundamental elite accommodation nor a major elite circulation in Bul-
garia. The postcommunist regime was dominated by apparatchik and techno-
cratic elites. Wider and deeper circulation, possibly accompanied by some steps 
toward an elite accommodation, did not unfold until the harrowing financial 
crisis that Bulgaria experienced in the mid-1990’s, to which we will return 
below.  
The transitions in Romania, Serbia, and, with qualifications, Croatia in-
volved real or de facto palace coups that slowed the dismantling of ideocratic 
elites and prevented significant elite circulation. Under the iron rule of the 
Ceausescus and the Securitate, the Romanian communist regime had straddled 
the line between the totalitarian and sultanistic types, relying more on dema-
gogic nationalist appeals and deification of the Ceausescus than on socialist 
shibboleths for coerced mobilizations (Linz and Stepan, 1996). In the face of an 
insurrection by Romania’s Hungarian minority in December 1989, the military 
elite, apparently in league with the Illiescu faction of the Communist Party, 
liquidated the Ceausescus. But no accommodation between competing elites 
was attempted, and a three-day “roundtable” discussion in late January 1990 
was a smokescreen for the Illiescu faction’s re-imposition of power, which was 
used later that year to smash opponents in the streets of Bucharest. Illiescu and 
his Democratic National Salvation Front routed challengers in the September 
1992 elections, formed a coalition with far-right and far-left parties, and re-
mained dominant during the next four years.  
In 1987, when Serbia still formed the core of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Mil-
osevic, the new president of the Serb League of Communists, used Serb ap-
peals for help against Muslims in Kosovo as a pretext for staging an internal 
party coup. He replaced reformist leaders with his own henchmen, and cloaked 
himself in Serb nationalist garb in order to stave off ultra-nationalists who were 
emerging rapidly as a powerful challenging force (Woodward, 1995, 89). Mil-
osevic’s pre-emptive moves enabled him and his entourage to survive the 
breakup of Yugoslavia during 1991 and to remain dominant in the rump Yugo-
slav state, which retained strong authoritarian features despite democratic trap-
pings. Although a significant number of people took advantage of the subse-
quent warfare and international sanctions imposed on Serbia to enrich 
themselves illegally and enter business and other elite positions, as late as 1997 
fully 60 percent of the business elite consisted of persons who had held high 
positions in the old communist regime, while the political elite remained cen-
tered on Milosevic and his cronies (Lazic, 1998). Despite the chaotic transition, 
in other words, elite circulation did not go far beyond the quasi-replacement 
pattern, and it was unaccompanied by pacts, negotiations, or other attempts at 
elite accommodation.  
 304 
In May 1990, when Croatia was still a Yugoslav republic, former commu-
nist general Franco Tudjman, who had also donned the nationalist mantle, led 
his Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) to victory in the first multi-party elec-
tions, winning 41.5 percent of the popular vote, but garnering 68 percent of 
parliamentary seats. Controlling parliament, Tudjman was immediately elected 
by that body to the Croatian presidency, and from that position he and his lieu-
tenants launched an intensive nationalist campaign (which included resurrect-
ing symbols of the fascist Croatian state during World War II) that quickly 
drove most holdover communists from elite positions and made Tudjman and 
the HDZ crushingly dominant. In this displacement of communist elites, circu-
lation was apparently a good deal wider (and perhaps deeper) than in Serbia-
Montenegro, and, once independence was declared in June 1991, it produced a 
distinctly new regime. Lacking data on the extent of turnover (many of Tud-
jman’s associates were returned ultra-nationalist Croat emigrés), we cannot say 
with confidence that the Croatian pattern was essentially that of a quasi-
replacement via what amounted to a palace coup, though we suspect that this is 
the most apt classification. The relevant alternative classification – of a sudden 
and sweeping circulation via a revolutionary overthrow – fits the complex 
Croatian events less well. What is clear is that, once Croatia emerged as an 
independent country, elites divided immediately into opposing ultra-nationalist 
and pro-democratic camps, with the former adopting strongly authoritarian 
tactics to handicap opponents and retain the upper hand in all subsequent elec-
toral contests (Pusic, 1998).  
In sum, ruling elites in Romania, Serbia, and Croatia relied to a large extent 
on nationalism, rather than communism, to justify their ascendancies immedi-
ately before and during the transitions to postcommunist regimes. These rela-
tively painless political-ideological about faces, aided by coup-like displace-
ments of ruling communist cliques, obviated the need for accommodations with 
opposition elites, and none of the three transitions was of the negotiated or 
pacted kind. The scope of elite circulation was narrow and shallow (except 
perhaps in Croatia), although its mode was fairly sudden and coerced. Despite 
putative democratic transitions, the three postcommunist regimes were in fact 
authoritarian, with entrenched elites adopting nationalist rhetoric and declaring 
virtual war on their opponents. The latter were excluded from power and sup-
pressed, and many opposition figures sought shelter abroad. 
The countries we have examined to this point do not, of course, exhaust the 
East European transitions to postcommunist regimes. We think, however, that 
they were relatively clear examples, during the transition years, of the elite 
configurations and circulation patterns we have posited: consensual elites and 
classic circulation (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic); fragmented 
elites and reproduction circulation (Slovakia and Bulgaria); divided elites in-
volving quasi-replacements (Romania, Serbia, and probably Croatia). What we 
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know about other cases during the transition years leads us to see them as fal-
ling less clearly into our model’s quadrants. 
The transition in Slovenia, for example, paralleled the Polish, Hungarian, 
and Czechslovak transitions, but only up to a point. As in the three Central 
European countries, Slovenian politics and society underwent rapid pluraliza-
tion during the late 1980’s (Ramet, 1997, 1998). Even more than in Hungary, 
however, this pluralization was aided and abetted by the ruling Slovene League 
of Communists (LC), whose liberal wing had expelled conservatives from the 
party in 1986. Thus, in March 1989, well before the Polish roundtable had 
concluded, and before the Hungarian roundtable had even begun, the LC pub-
lished a document calling for political pluralism, acceptance of open political 
conflicts, and rejection of communist doctrine as the only permissible form of 
political expression. A major reason for this at the time regionally unprece-
dented liberalization was external, namely, fear of the Serb nationalism that 
Milosowic was stoking in Yugoslavia’s core republic. During the two years 
that followed, this fear kept Slovene elites marching in the same direction, 
though it is unclear if a negotiated elite accommodation occurred.  
In December 1989, the Slovene LC called for multi-party elections, and 
these were held in April 1990. By that time, a phletora of parties had emerged 
and the elections were won by a seven-party coalition, DEMOS, which later in 
1990 presided over the Slovene Assembly’s annulment of thirty federal Yugo-
slav laws, as well as a referendum in which 88 percent of Slovenes voted for 
independence from Yugoslavia. It is possible that an important amount of elite 
accommodation was then achieved via the deliberations of a roundtable-like 
constitutional commission, which included a hundred leaders from most major 
sectors of Slovene society. In any event, after successfully prosecuting Slove-
nia’s two-week, relatively bloodless “war of independence” in late June and 
early July 1991, the DEMOS coalition government unravelled in a host of deep 
political, clerical, and constitutional disputes. In the first post-independence 
elections, held at the end of 1992, the Liberal Democratic Party, which was a 
descendant of the former Communist youth organization, received the largest 
number of votes, and its leader, Janez Drnovsek, became prime minister. In 
simultaneous balloting, the former president of communist Slovenia, Milan 
Kucan, was elected to the presidency for a five-year term. While the Slovene 
transition was certainly complex and conducive to conflicting interpretations, 
we see no compelling evidence that an elite consensus emerged to the same 
extent as among the Polish, Hungarian, and Czech elites. We are inclined to 
view the prominence of communist and former communist elites during and 
after the Slovene transition as indicating a pattern of reproduction circulation, 
and we will assess below the extent of elite fragmentation since the transition 
years.  
What of the former Soviet republics? Excluding the Baltics, about which we 
frankly know too little (but see Steen, 1997, who concludes on the basis of 
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extensive survey data that elites in Estonia and Latvia are strongly ethnocratic 
and exclusionary, while those in Lithuania have not achieved broad consensus), 
we think that no republic emerged from the Soviet Union’s collapse at the end 
of 1991 with consensual elites. We have elsewhere reviewed the unsuccessful 
attempts to achieve elite accommodation in Russia during the transition years 
(Higley and Pakulski, 1995; Kullberg, Higley and Pakulski 1998), and the 
bitter fight between leaders of the Yeltsin-led coalition that founded the new 
Russian regime has been discussed extensively (e.g., Brudny, 1995; Gill 1998). 
Drawing on interviews that David Lane (1997) conducted during 1993 and 
1994 with samples of both the Gorbachev and Yeltsin elite cohorts, we have 
concluded more recently (Higley, Pakulski, and Wesolowski, 1998; Kullberg, 
Higley and Pakulski 1998) that Soviet and then Russian elites are best viewed 
as fragmented before, during, and immediately after the 1991 regime collapse. 
Moreover, data on Russian elite circulation during the transition years show a 
strong reproduction pattern (Wasilewski, 1998; White and Krystanovskaya, 
1998). 
We have argued that a reproduction pattern also unfolded in Ukraine, where 
entrenched elites for the most part simply traded their communist badges for 
nationalist ones, declared independence in September 1991, but did not hold 
democratic elections until 1994, and where, once elected, a constitutionally 
powerful parliament, in which the re-legalized Communist Party bulked large 
(but in which fourteen other parties were also represented), stymied govern-
ment reform efforts. Elite fragmentation was indicated not only by the hetero-
geneous parliament elected in 1994 and its conflicts with the executive branch, 
but also by regional elites rooted in opposing cultural and economic bases that 
pushed strongly for decentralization and challenged national integration. We 
are, however, unaware of interview and circulation data that would support 
placing Ukraine elites in our model’s “fragmented” quadrant during the transi-
tion years, and we think that viewing them as divided is equally plausible. 
As regards Belarus and the numerous other former Soviet republics (except 
for the Baltics), possibly the less said the better. Virtually none has yet com-
pleted a democratic transition. In Belarus, as in Ukraine, the first popularly 
contested presidential election was delayed until 1994, when an independent 
candidate, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, won a surprise victory. Parliamentary 
elections were held, for the most part unsuccessfully, in 1995, by which time 
Lukashenka was showing a marked plebiscitarian-populist bent. He has since 
acted in steadily more autocratic ways, so that politics in Belarus have been 
largely devoid of meaningful democratic content. Elsewhere in the former 
Soviet republics (with the notable exception of Mongolia and the partial excep-
tion of Georgia), although nominally contested and participatory elections were 
held and the old ideocratic elite configuration unravelled, elites divided into 
warring camps almost immediately. One camp had the upper hand and was led 
by a “strong man,” who usually turned out to be the former Communist boss in 
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a new nationalist guise: Aliyev in Azerbaijan, Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan, 
Snegur in Moldova, Nabiyev in Tajikistan (until he died in the midst of civil 
war in 1993), Niyazov in Turkmenistan, Karimov in Uzbekistan.  
Elite Change Since the Transition Years  
Political developments in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic during the 
last few years strongly indicate the strengthening of consensual elites. In Po-
land, the 1989 roundtable agreement, subsequently renegotiated in 1990, laid 
the ground for a broad and lasting elite consensus. This has embraced not only 
democratic institutions and procedures, but such strategic goals as comprehen-
sive privatization and joining NATO and the European Union. The consensus 
has persisted in spite of rapid elite turnover, institutional changes such as a new 
constitution and three successive sets of electoral rules, and important policy 
differences between, for example, liberal reformers and the Peasant Party. As 
was widely noted during the 1997 parliamentary election campaign, leaders of 
the major Polish political parties and groups have found it difficult to distin-
guish themselves from their rivals in more than cosmetic ways. They focus on 
personalities and take single-issue stands to delineate themselves and their 
parties to voters. Unlike in neighboring Ukraine, debates have centered on the 
pace of marketizing reforms and the exact makeup of democratic institutions, 
but not on the desirability of either. The main disputes have been over the 
scope of presidential power, the extent of welfare rights, and church-state rela-
tions, especially as regards policy toward abortion.  
On the surface, relations between Polish elite groups have looked tense. 
Rapid turnover in government office holding, jockeying among Solidarity 
factions, and institutional ambiguities under the “little constitution” that was in 
force between 1990 and 1997 have made for a weak collective elite identity 
(Pankow, 1998). But neither these fragmenting tendencies nor the former 
communists’ electoral successes in 1993 and 1995 threatened the underlying 
elite consensus achieved in 1989-90. The 1997 constitutional referendum and 
parliamentary elections clearly reflected this underlying consensus. Both pro-
ceeded successfully and peacefully, albeit with rather low levels of public 
interest and participation. The referendum approved a new constitution, which 
was a victory for the SLD, while the parliamentary elections ended with the 
center-right Solidarity Electoral Alliance (AWS) winning the largest share of 
Sejm seats (201 of 460). Protracted but eminently prosaic negotiations eventu-
ally produced a coalition government of the AWS and the liberal Freedom 
Union (UW). This change of government – Poland’s fourth since 1989 – was as 
smooth as previous ones, and the cohabitation of the left-of-center president, 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, with the center-right government headed by Jerzy 
Buzek has since been harmonious enough. These recent events have buttressed 
the conclusion reached by Wasilewski (1998) that in Poland today democracy 
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is the only game in town and its consolidation is well advanced (see also Smo-
lar, 1998). Mach and Wesolowski (1998), although more cautious in their con-
clusions based on a survey of 215 MPs and 61 candidates representing all po-
litical parties and conducted during the 1993 elections in Poland, seem to 
confirm this diagnosis. Politicians from all parties surveyed, they conclude, 
show consensus as to the desirable characteristics of politicians, namely, “the 
capacity to lead; ability to build social consensus for their programs and goals” 
(1998:23). A similar consensus was found in understanding of politics as ac-
tivities strengthening the state and representing the entire society and “good 
authority” as involving respect for the letter of law, protection of personal 
freedoms and liberties and freedom of expression. Wesolowski and his team 
discovered a commonality of perceptions and attitudes in spite of sharp divi-
sions in political rhetoric during the election campaign, as well as basic agree-
ments as to the necessity and the main direction of the economic and political 
reforms. The differences appear mainly in the world-views declared during the 
election campaign (see also Jasiecki 1998).  
Hungarian and Czech developments have followed a similar trajectory. The 
victory of the ex-communist Socialists in Hungary’s May 1994 elections did 
nothing to weaken the consensual elite configuration that formed in the late 
1980’s and that was sealed at the 1989 roundtable in Budapest. In 1994, small 
and disaffected left- and right-wing elite groups gained no significant support, 
and the alternation of government that followed was as smooth as the Polish 
alternations. The Socialists’ victory came less as a surprise than as a return to 
power of the original reformers. This can be seen, quite strikingly, in the ca-
reers of economic and cultural elites, which show strong links with the com-
munist past (Lengyel 1998; Lengyel and Bartha, 1998; Szalai, 1998). But it is 
also apparent in politicians’ careers. Most recently, for example, the Hungarian 
Democratic Forum’s (HDF) national board announced that the party included 
Imre Pozsgay, a leading reformist in the former Communist party, on the 
HDF’s national candidate list. Studies of Hungarian political and administrative 
elites show considerable elite circulation that rests on marked career continui-
ties between the communist and postcommunist periods, increasing levels of 
education and administrative experience, and relatively high levels of personal 
satisfaction among elites (Lengyel, 1998). The victory of the crntre-right coali-
tion in the May 1998 parliamentary election seems to confirm these regulari-
ties. The new generation of Fidesz parliamentarians, exemplified by Victor 
Orban, seem to approximate the professional type more closely than their so-
cialist colleagues. The picture is one of ever more professionalized political and 
technocratic leaders engaged in the restrained competitions typical of consen-
sual elites and consolidated democratic regimes.  
As already noted, the velvet divorce in Czechoslovakia at the end of 1992 
contributed to the unity of Czech elites by removing main sources of ethnic and 
economic policy conflicts. The Slovaks’ departure also opened up numerous 
 309 
elite positions for younger technocratic and professional aspirants (Machonin, 
1994; Brokl and Mansfeldova, 1998). In spite of personal animosities between 
“the two Vaclavs” (President Havel and Prime Minister Klaus), a consensus 
encompassed most governing and opposition elites. Havel and his entourage, 
the governing and merged Civic and Christian Democrats, and the opposition 
Social Democrats all stressed their support of democratic principles, EU mem-
bership, and privatization. They differed over the pace of economic reforms, 
governing style, and welfare policies. However, the differences over economic 
reforms seemed even less pronounced than in Poland, where many leaders of 
the strong trade union movement, including the remnants of Solidarity, hotly 
resisted the “shock therapy” instituted by Leszek Balcerowicz in 1992. The 
Czech trade union elite by and large supported economic reforms and cooper-
ated with the Klaus government. Another difference with Poland, which helped 
Czech elite unity, was the presence of an unreformed Communist party that 
was too small to mobilize public discontent, but that could be handily blamed 
for the communist past. Thus, while in the 1993 Polish and 1994 Hungarian 
elections strong former communist parties – the SLD and the MSzP, respec-
tively – harnessed widespread economic frustrations to stage political come-
backs, in the Czech Republic it has been the Social Democrats, largely uncon-
nected to the old communist regime, who have profited most from popular 
discontents, though not yet enough to form a government. Following the col-
lapse of the Klaus government in Spring 1998, amidst the allegation of corrup-
tion, and following the June 1998 parliamentary elections, the centre-left coali-
tion is emerging, with basically the same reformist program as their centre-
right predecessors. 
We are less certain about adding Slovenia to the list of postcommunist coun-
tries that clearly display a consensual elite, though there is a case for making 
this addition. Exhibit A in that case is the remarkably smooth and cooperative 
relations between leaders of the governing coalition’s Liberal Democrats, 
Christian Democrats, and Social Democrats. Agreement about Slovene policies 
toward Italy and the current Yugoslavia extended to agreement about the 1996 
budget – to the surprise of Prime Minister Drnovsek. On the other hand, elite 
tensions have been fueled by scandals and seedy political deals, and by the 
high-handed, plebiscitarian actions of former defense minister, Janez Jansa. 
President Kucan, who is in many ways similar in his political career, low-
profile presidency, and conciliatory actions to Poland’s president, Kwas-
niewski, has generally avoided taking sides in elite policy disputes.  
If the Slovene patterns are ambiguous in terms of our model, those in Slova-
kia since 1992 square with our category of a fragmented elite operating an 
unconsolidated democracy (Szomolanyi, 1997). The velvet divorce from the 
Czech lands was at once the consequence of rising Slovak opposition to rapid 
and deep reforms and the basis for avoiding reforms subsequently. This avoid-
ance contributed to fragmentation, even polarization of the political scene 
 310 
between pro-reform and pro-Western “liberal” factions, on the one side, and 
“preservationist” and nationalist factions, some of which wanted to promote 
closer ties with Slovakia’s eastern neighbors, on the other.  
Students of the Slovak politics emphasize both the “informalities” that per-
meate elite power games, and the rather loose treatment of legal and political 
norms by the ruling groups (Gould and Szomolanyi 1998). Since the 1994 
elections Meciar’s HZDS formed a ramshackle alliance with the extremist 
right-wing Slovak National Party (SNS) and the far-left Association of Work-
ers of Slovakia (ZSR). This political marriage of convenience, formed opportu-
nistically in order to maintain the patronage and control structure of the “party 
of power”, results in a HZDS-dominated government. Almost all top govern-
ment posts have been held by ex-communists, and HZDS membership has been 
a criterion for appointment to key administrative posts, so that a strongly clien-
telist power structure clearly exists (Miklos, 1997). Moreover, a bitter and 
long-lasting confrontation between Meciar, as prime minister, and Michal 
Kovac, the president, indicated substantial elite disunity. The May 1997 deba-
cle of a referendum about seeking NATO membership and altering the rules for 
presidential elections – invalidated because of spoiled ballot papers and low 
turnout – further increased elite tensions. The readiness of Meciar and his 
HZDS to bend or flout rules of the democratic game was apparent as Michal 
Kovac’s presidential term ended in early March 1998. Refusing even to nomi-
nate a successor to Kovac while using HZDS numbers to prevent the three-
fifths vote in parliament needed to elect a new president, Meciar arrogated 
presidential powers to himself, and he used them to halt a police investigation 
of the mysterious kidnapping of Kovac’s son two years earlier and to cancel a 
Kovac-supported referendum calling for direct presidential elections. Through 
May 1998, the Slovak parliament remained stymied in its efforts to elect a new 
president, while Meciar wielded both prime ministerial and presidential pow-
ers. 
In spite of the mixture of patronage and intimidation, the Slovak system 
maintains a fair amount of pluralism and the key democratic characteristics. 
The opposition is dominated, but through parliamentary majority; it is politi-
cally peripheralised, but not silenced and/or terrorized. The dominant ruling 
party does “colonize” existing interest groups, but its control is far from com-
plete, and it does not extend to all spheres of power. The pattern of elite con-
flict and collusion has been described as “fragmented polarization” (Lukas and 
Szomolanyi 1996). 
The Bulgarian elite has displayed similar signs of fragmentation. Partly due 
to divisions among the many parties making up the opposition Union of De-
mocratic Forces (UDF), the ex-communist Socialists remained dominant 
through 1996. However, toward the end of that year, and amid virtual eco-
nomic collapse, the situation began to change, with the election of a UDF 
leader, Petar Stoyanov, to the presidency, the resignation of BSF prime minis-
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ter Zhan Videnov, and widening splits within the BSP elite over obviously 
failed economic policies. A “bloodless revolution” involving large-scale dem-
onstrations in Sofia and other cities in early 1997 led to the removal of BSP 
supporters from local councils and to scheduling early parliamentary elections. 
Those elections, in April 1997, were won overwhelmingly by the UDF, which 
then constructed a reform-oriented government. No doubt recalling how its first 
attempt at governing disintegrated in 1992, the second UDF government has 
been marked by a closing of ranks around a democratic-reformist program. 
However, elite conflicts and distrusts remain large, elite differentiation contin-
ues to be limited, and a democratic-reformist consensus is weak at best. Al-
though the principal elite groups try to paper over their lack of unity with ap-
peals for national solidarity, they strike us as basically fragmented.  
Elites in Romania and Ukrainia have recently straddled the line between the 
divided and fragmented configurations. Both sets of elites engaged in a brief 
period of reformist activity, backed by elite pacts, during the mid-1990’s, but 
fundamental oppositions have not been eliminated. In Romania, as noted ear-
lier, Illiescu was re-elected to the presidency in 1992. His ex-communist Party 
of Social Democracy governed in coalition with the Democratic Agrarian Party 
and, until the weeks preceding new elections in November 1996, with the ultra-
nationalist and anti-Hungarian National Unity Party. The old communist estab-
lishment’s entrenchment was even more pronounced than in Bulgaria under the 
BSP, and it displayed an extreme form of reproduction following the quasi-
replacement that it underwent in the palace coup against the Ceausescus at the 
end of 1989. However, 1996 parliamentary and presidential elections resulted 
in an unexpectedly decisive victory by reformist forces. An alliance of the 
center-right Democratic Convention (DCR), the Social Democratic Union 
(SDU), and the Hungarian Democratic Federation (HDFR) formed a new gov-
ernment, with the DCR’s Emil Constantinescu becoming president, and the 
alliance’s Victor Ciroba taking the prime ministership. Wholly unfamiliar with 
governing, the coalition suffered immediately from internal divisions and con-
flicts that were in many ways analogous to the conflicts within the Bulgarian 
UDF during its first and failed period of government in 1991-92. Reforms were 
stalled, partly by internal squabbles over government posts, and partly by the 
opposition of unreformed ex-communist administrators. Tensions with the 
Hungarian and Roma minorities increased, fueled by heavy-handed policies 
and massive corruption scandals. In March 1997, Ciorba resigned, and, because 
of factional jockeying and policy fights within the weak coalition government, 
it took nearly a year to reach agreement on a new prime minister, Radu Vaile. 
Elite changes in Ukraine have moved along a track similar to that in Roma-
nia, albeit without a change of government. The Ukrainian elite was born di-
vided when independence was declared in 1991, with the dominant and mainly 
Russophone Communists facing what was initially a powerful Russophobe 
movement, the RUKH. Government machinery and economic enterprises have 
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remained largely in the hands of former nomenklatura apparatchiks, whose 
machinations involve much corrupt and criminal activity and who, as their 
Illiescu-led counterparts long did in Romania, uphold the institutional status 
quo that anchors their positions. Leaders of military-industrial state corpora-
tions, which are the main employers in the more industrialized eastern half of 
Ukraine, have pressed to restore economic ties to Russia. Nationalist factions 
have agitated for greater independence from Russia, but they advocate conflict-
ing policies and are generally ambivalent about privatization and marketization.  
The result has been elite division and political deadlock amid drastic eco-
nomic decline. In presidential elections during 1994, voters split cleanly along 
ethnic-regional lines. After a narrow victory, the Russian-speaking Leonid 
Kuchma appealed for national unity, and he signed a pact with key leaders that 
helped to limit elite conflict in the crucial post-election period. With Russian 
and Western support, Kuchma’s administration tried to initiate serious eco-
nomic reforms. But the power-sharing pact between Kuchma and leaders of the 
Communist-dominated parliament was far from successful. Relations between 
the president and parliament have since erupted periodically in confrontations 
over their respective powers. There are no signs of a democratic-reformist elite 
policy consensus; there is, instead, a “nostalgia for authoritarianism” (Prizel, 
1997, 363). The March 1998 parliamentary elections appear to have cemented 
elite disarray. About one third of the electorate voted for small parties that 
failed to get into parliament. The proportion of those who won election as 
independents was even larger than in 1994, and the largest number of non-
independent seats went to left-wing anti-reform parties, whose strength in 
parliament increased from 30 to 40 percent. Center-right forces were weakened 
and dispersed, parliament seems even more likely to block marketizing re-
forms, and the economic situation remains dire. The portents are for continuing 
political gridlock and increasing calls to rein in Ukraine’s democratic “ex-
cesses”.  
To summarize, since the transition years there has been quite limited elite 
change in Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine. In all four countries, but 
especially in Romania and Ukraine, we continue to observe weak unity and 
narrow differentiation, indicated by the existence of deeply opposed elite 
camps. In Slovakia and Bulgaria, there is no evidence of a fundamental elite 
accommodation, and elites in both countries are best viewed as fragmented and 
as presiding over democratic regimes that are clearly unconsolidated. The 
change of government in Romania late in 1996 got a liberalization of en-
trenched institutions and power formations started, but in Ukraine there is scant 
evidence that such a liberalization has begun. Ethnic cleavages are high on the 
political agendas in Romania and Ukraine (and hardly absent in Slovakia and 
Bulgaria), and elites challenging the parties of power in both countries must be 
regarded as disorganized and ineffective. So long as elites in Romania and 
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Ukraine are divided over fundamental aspects of democracy, economic reform, 
and national unity, democratic regimes will remain fledgling at best.  
During the first half of the 1990’s, it was difficult to establish which elite 
configuration – divided or fragmented – was emerging in Russia. Analyses of 
elite circulation revealed a strong reproduction pattern. Using elite survey data, 
Wasilewski (1998) calculated that, if retirees were excluded, the ratio of 1988 
nomenklatura elites who held elite positions in 1993 to those who had lost such 
positions was 88:10. Synthesizing a number of studies and themselves analyz-
ing the fates of 3,610 executive, party, parliamentary, regional, and economic-
business elite position holders from the Brezhnev government in 1980 to the 
Yeltsin government at the end of 1993, Stephen White and Olga 
Kryshtanovskaya (1998) have similarly concluded that only 10 percent of the 
Yeltsin elite were new to power circles, while the other 90 percent had spent an 
average of 11.4 years in nomenklatura (though not necessarily elite) positions 
before the U.S.S.R.’s demise in 1991. Meanwhile, and as already mentioned, 
David Lane, using interview materials, found that Russian elites in 1994 were 
split down the middle in their retrospective views of whether the Soviet regime 
had been basically healthy or irretrievably flawed and whether therapeutic 
measures (institutional reforms or a basic overhaul) might have saved the re-
gime. He further found that Russian elites were similarly divided over the 
Yeltsin regime’s goals and policies. Taken with the attempted coup in August 
1991, the unpacted regime transition that followed it, the violent showdown 
between Yeltsin and parliament in 1993, as well as many indications in the 
disastrous Chechnya intervention of 1994-95 that military and security forces 
were going their own ways, a classification of the Russian elite during the first 
half of the 1990’s as fundamentally divided and as awaiting the instauration of 
an authoritarian regime was plausible, even if we, writing in 1995, opted cau-
tiously for a view of the elite as fragmented and of the regime as an unconsoli-
dated democracy. The similar picture emerges from the elite analyses summa-
rised by Gill (1997; 1998). He concludes that the instability in the Russian elite 
reflects deep fragmentation between different “camps” and regional alliances, 
which involve the new business leaders. However, there are also signs of post-
1993 elite consolidation, though taking a form short-term interest-pacts, rather 
than more robust elite consensus. 
We think that events in Russia during the past three years have born out our 
somewhat optimistic assessment. First, it is now clearly impossible to discern 
just two or three well-articulated elite camps locked in mortal combat, as is the 
case in a divided elite. There is, rather, a phletora of elites: numerous business 
and parastatal groups that compete against each other (as in the “bankers’ war” 
during 1997), a congeries of squabbling party elites, relatively autonomous but 
internally divided military and security leaderships, several trade union federa-
tions, powerful provincial governors and associations of the regions, a relative-
ly efficient and autonomous central bank, an influential collective farm lobby, 
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the bloated but powerful presidential entourage, a variety of watchdog media 
organizations, the resurgent Orthodox church – not to mention an unknown but 
apparently large number of organized criminal groups. All of these formations, 
and more, are competing for the assets of a “soft state” that is largely unable to 
enforce its laws and decrees (Remington, 1997). Second, relatively free, fair, 
and participatory elections were held for the Duma in December 1995 and for 
the presidency in June 1996. Dire forecasts that the presidential election would 
be cancelled, or at least thoroughly rigged, proved incorrect. To be sure, signs 
of increasing elite moderation and adaptation to peaceful electoral contests are 
offset by bitter policy disputes and much elite mistrust, fueled by Yeltsin’s 
erratic health and behavior, as well as by economic disarray and the social 
tensions it generates. Conflicts between the executive and legislative branches 
persist, and in April 1998 they again approached the boiling point when the 
Duma twice rejected Yeltsin’s surprise nominee for the prime ministership, 
Kiriyenko. Nevertheless, each electoral contest has been more peaceful and 
orderly than the one preceding it, and each standoff between the executive and 
parliament has been defused or circumvented. In short, a fragmented, rather 
than a divided elite seems clearly to have emerged in Russia, and the regime is 
just as clearly an unconsolidated democracy. 
Finally, there can be little doubt about the depth of elite divisions in Belarus, 
Serbia, Croatia, and Albania. Belarus risks the outbreak of civil warfare over 
the authoritarian and repressive actions of its president, Lukashenka. The media 
and judiciary are muzzled, and protestors are harassed by the police. In June 
1996, Lukashenka launched a court case against the opposition Popular Front, 
the leader of which, Zyanon Pasnyak, fled to the United States. In 1997, Luka-
shenka illegally changed the constitution, dissolved parliament, and created a 
subservient legislature. In Serbia, Milosevic follows a similarly repressive line, 
which is described by his opponents as “a savage hunt for people” (Markotich, 
1996). The main divisions are between the mafia-like Milosevic party machine, 
the opposition Serbian Renewal Movement, and the ultra-nationalist Radical 
Party led by Vojislav Seselj, with which Milosevic formed a coalition govern-
ment in early 1998. A growing rift with Montenegro, led by the reformist 
president Miljo Djukanovic, and spreading civil war in Kosovo are clear symp-
toms of a divided elite and an authoritarian regime. Like Serbia, Croatia ex-
perienced a very limited elite mobility; most of elite circulation, in fact, oc-
cured before 1989 (Sekulic and Sporer 1998). Most of the changes consisted of 
ethnic purge in the leadership. There is a limited degree of political pluralism, 
religious freedom, and some social and economic pluralism. The ascendant and 
generally ultra-nationalist HDZ forces led by Tudjman exert near total control 
of the media and the judiciary, they have altered the electoral system to ensure 
absolute parliamentary majorities for themselves, and if they fare badly in local 
elections, as they did in the Zagreb municipal elections of 1995, they refuse to 
relinquish power (Pusic, 1998, 116-17). As for Albania, internal turmoil, bor-
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dering on anarchy, followed the collapse of several pyramid financial schemes 
and struggles between elites allied with Sali Berisha and those heading the 
formerly communist Socialist Party. The 1996 election was judged by interna-
tional observers to be deeply flawed. After a second, less fraudulent election 
brought the Socialists back to power in 1997, Berisha was driven from the 
presidency by mass protests and political clashes. As in most of the former 
Soviet Republics, one cannot speak seriously of a democratic regime in Alba-
nia, where elites appear irremediably divided. 
Conclusions 
During the transition years, from roughly 1988 to 1994, elite change involved 
substantial accommodation and the emergence of what approximated an ethos 
of “unity in diversity,” as well as fairly wide, deep, gradual, and peaceful circu-
lation, in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech part of the former Czechoslovakia. 
Although explicit elite accommodation was not so evident in Slovenia, where 
top-level former communists continued to hold leading positions, the rapid 
liberalization of the Slovene League of Communists, reacting to ominous de-
velopments in Serbia, plus a surrogate roundtable in the form of a constitu-
tional commission, produced a degree of elite unity sufficient to move Slovenia 
onto the road to democratic consolidation. Since the transition years, politics in 
all four countries have been dominated increasingly by professional politicians 
and technocrats practicing the tradeoffs required by democratic competitions 
and institutions.  
During the transition years in Bulgaria and Slovakia, however, none of the 
forgoing was as evident, and politics were dominated by holdover “parties of 
power” that rode roughshod over their opponents. This was also the case in 
Russia. In all three countries, the prevailing elite configuration was one of 
fragmentation (especially apparent in the numerous but disorganized opposition 
groups), and the dominant elite alignment consisted of former apparatchiks and 
technocrats. The situation was worse in Romania, Ukraine, Serbia, and Croatia, 
where palace coups or the mere exchange of communist for nationalist banners 
prevented elite accommodations and any significant amounts of elite circula-
tion, and resulted in nominally democratic, but actually quite authoritarian, 
regimes dominated by former apparatchiks cum populists like Illiescu and 
Milosevic, ultra-nationalists like Tudjman, and the large bloc of Communists in 
the Ukraine parliament. Since the transition years, electoral victories by opposi-
tion elites in Bulgaria and Romania, as well as the successful conduct of two 
elections in Russia, have indicated a firming of formal democratic processes, 
though evidence of a greater degree of elite unity is lacking in all three coun-
tries. Meanwhile, elite divisions in Ukraine, Serbia, and Croatia remain deep. It 
is not possible to speak of democratic consolidation in any of these countries. 
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Needless to say, the patterns of elite change and resulting configurations of 
national elites that we have distinguished are, to a large extent, ideal-typical 
constructs. Events and developments have often combined elements of two or 
more types, so that the actual elite configurations in postcommunist Central and 
Eastern Europe only approximate, with varying degrees of closeness, our ideal 
types. Our classifications and analyses should be judged, therefore, in terms of 
the plausibility of our theoretical constructs and the accuracy of our historical-
political applications. We are acutely aware of the complexity of the historical 
processes and political configurations in each country, and of the simplifica-
tions we have introduced.  
Finally, we hope it is clear that this paper’s explanatory aspirations have 
been limited. We have constructed and linked several typologies that together 
point toward a more comprehensive model of elite and regime change. An 
important feature of the model is that it does not attribute causal priority to any 
one dimension of elites; rather, elite change occurs simultaneously along all 
three dimensions: unity, differentiation, and circulation. This leaves space for 
historical variations in causal sequences and loops. For example, patterns of 
elite circulation must be seen as both causes and outcomes of the extent of 
unity and differentiation. The task of identifying the directions of causal chains 
and of weighting causal factors must be left to more historically detailed inves-
tigations. Our effort has been to provide a model and some suggestions about 
broad historical patterns with which such investigations can better proceed. 
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